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INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM AND
GOVERNMENTAL
RESTRAINTS. By Walter Gellhorn. Louisiana State University
Press, 1956. Pp. vi, 215. $3.75.
The Edward Douglas White lectures at Louisiana State University
afforded Professor Gellhorn an opportunity to review three questions:
Why have so many people recently changed sides in their attitudes toward
the administrative process; are we losing more than we are gaining in the
current wave of censorship; and, do we unwittingly sanction, by constant
expansion of licensing of trades and occupations, regimentation and
monopoly power. The questions may appear discrete, but in each instance
the answer given at any time will turn on the weight one gives to freedom
of the individual when it is set on the scales with real or imagined need
for government intervention. The answers of the immediate past unfortunately suggest that in most instances individual freedom does not tip the
scales.
Perhaps the most dramatic proof of this is in Professor Gellhorn's
first chapter, on the administrative process. Early mutterings of discontent and disapproval when administrative agencies were few in number
rose to a storm with the multiplication of "alphabetical" agencies during
the early depression years. The organized bar inveighed against "the evils
notoriously prevalent" in administrative tribunals,1 Dean Roscoe Pound
added his criticisms,2 and a legislative campaign to "improve" the administrative process, temporarily aborted by President Roosevelt's veto
of the Logan-Walter bill in 1940, finally culminated in a successful effort
to limit administrative authority while expanding judicial review, the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.
Since then attitudes have changed. The shape of things to come was
apparent in the episode of Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath.3

Wong had

been ordered deported after administrative proceedings which concededly
fell far short of Administrative Procedure Act standards, but when the
Supreme Court ruled that such standards must be met in deportation cases,
Senator McCarran and Representative Walter, the same two men who had
been instrumental in securing the passage of the act, were the moving
spirits behind the legislation that overruled that decision. The quondam
critics of "bureaucracy" have since been zealous in putting into the hands
of administrators a vast new congeries of powers over individual rights.
Professor Gellhorn rejects as too facile the explanation that former
detractors have become advocates because they are concerned about national
security. Some have, of course. As Alexander Hamilton warned, external
1. 59 A.B.A. REP. 539, 544, 549 (1934).
2. 63 A.B.A. Rnp. 331, 343 (1938). Dean Pound's strictures are evaluated in Jaffe,
Invective and Investigation it Administrative Law, 52 HARV. L. Rtv. 1201, 1211 (1939).
3. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
(146)

1957]

BOOK REVIEWS

threats will bend, in time, "even the ardent love of liberty." 4 But many
who favor the extension, Professor Gellhorn believes, are simply "repression-minded as a matter of taste rather than need." (p. 17). These, in
the phrase of Richard W. Hofstadter,5 are the "pseudo-conservatives," who
talk of the dangers of "Big Government" while pushing it further into new
and hitherto forbidden zones.
The other side of the coin is the disillusionment of the former defenders
of the administrative process, among whom Professor Gellhorn is quick
to admit he must be numbered. His own fears are compounded by the
change in the nature of the problems which now are thrust upon administrators. No longer are the problems essentially economic and essentially
factual. "Expertise" in its traditional sense is no longer present, for
example, when a consul decides whether to issue a visa to a foreigner
wanting to come to the United States. Even the limited judicial review
which heretofore has been available is often gone. The administrator has
essentially absolute authority in deportation orders, for example, which
may result "in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life
worth living," 0 or in dismissals from the government or from private industry for security reasons.
These problems are different, and the willingness to concede such
powers to administrative judgments is frightening. The combination is
quite enough to rally the liberals to the banner of a vigorous critic of the
early administrative agencies: "Justice cannot stand half free and half
enslaved. . .
We cannot have, in this country, two systems of dispensing justice-one . . . safeguarded by restrictions and limitations and

privileges which have been found to be wise and necessary through centuries of experience, and another system administered largely in disregard
of our principles of jurisprudence, largely in disregard of the limitations,
restrictions and privileges which our courts have found it wise and necessary to observe. . . .,,7
Professor Gellhorn's second chapter, on censorship, covers with broad
strokes the route we have travelled in the United States from the era of
Anthony Comstock (and in England from the somewhat earlier Lord
Campbell's Act in 1857) to our present combination of private, semiprivate, and outright governmental restraints on the books we may read.
Since the book was written, the Supreme Court has held in Roth v.
United States 8 that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally
protected speech or press." 9 Justice Harlan, one of three Justices who
dissented, was unable to see the problem in such a generalized fashion.
"The Court seems to assume," he said, "that 'obscenity' is a peculiar genus
4. TBf FtDm AwST No. 8 (Hamilton).
5. Hofstadter, The Pseido-ConservativeRevolt, 24 Am. ScioLAR1 9, 24 (1955).
6. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
7. The statement was made in 1944 by the president of the Cleveland Bar Association, E. F. Woodle. See Let's Decide Every Case on Its Merits, 28 J. Am. JXM. Soc.
118-19 (1944).
8. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
9. Id. at 485.
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of 'speech and press,' which is as distinct, recognizable, and classifiable as
poison ivy is among other plants." 10 Professor Gellhorn would, I am sure,
join justice Harlan, and we need do no more than survey his brief history
of changing tastes and changing mores to understand that, whatever may
be the result for Mr. Roth's books and advertising circulars, the Court has
left unanswered many problems by its statement that "implicit in the history
of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without
redeeming social importance." "More significant than the problem of definition, however, is the machinery of government censorship. Both the Post Office and the Bureau
of Customs of the Treasury Department withhold from delivery to American citizens vast quantities of books and publications. Their procedures
are little known, the decisions are largely ex parte, and of more importance,
there is no public announcement of the decisions and no opportunity for
public review and evaluation of the results. And when, as Professor
Gellhorn points out, the same machinery is invoked by a somewhat strained
interpretation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act to prevent the exposure to the American public of "foreign propaganda," the potential damage is enormously enhanced.
Professor Gellhorn's plea is for a return to common law and common
sense. "Public indecency," where unwelcome conduct is thrust upon fellow
citizens who cannot escape it is, one thing. Requiring that everyone must
first approve of a communication before it can be transmitted to another
person is quite different. He would, I think, worry less about the first
amendment than about the blindness of men who sanction more and more
suppression.
"Why throw reformist energies into preventing the gratification
of low tastes? Why not try instead to unravel the mystery of forming
elevated tastes and interests, so that effective self-censorship may
replace the clumsy external controls now attempted? Like any other
freedom, the freedom to read can be used unwisely. But fear that
freedom may be improvidently exercised does not justify its destruction. Foolish reading cannot be ended by force, but only by patient
persuasion, by education rather than edict." (p. 103).
The third chapter of the book deals with an aspect of the right to work
which deserves far more attention than it has received-occupational licensing. Scores of vocations have come to the point, first, of occupational
organization, and then to the demand that they be subject to licensing and
regulation. Only rarely is licensing imposed rather than induced, and only
rarely is there opposition except sheer legislative inertia. The result has
been licensed bee dealers, embalmers, beer coil cleaners, photographers, bait
fishing boat operators, egg graders, guide dog trainers, and scores of others.
10. Id. at 497.
11. Id. at 484.
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There are, of course, some advantages to the public. Complaints to a
licensing board are more apt to be effective than law suits. Misfits and
wholly unsuitable persons may be discouraged from attempts at an occupation in which they would be doomed to failure. But the cost in terms of
dwindling freedom to choose a vocation-even if the choice is sometimes
wrong-is becoming significant. A society of movement, of freedom, is
tending to become a society of status.
Moreover, once a group achieves status it tends to rigidify it as did
the medieval guilds. Price-or "fee"-fixing power is often obtained.
Entrance requirements are stiffened to prevent undue competition. In one
state, Professor Gellhorn points out, a high school graduate who wishes
to become a master plumber must undergo a longer course of preparation
than one who wishes to become a physician. Each group seeks selfadministration, and a few more soft feathers for its own nest. And the
existence of the licensing system furnishes a ready-made machinery for
intruding irrelevancies into the right to work--citizenship, a period, frequently extensive, of antecedent local residence, and more recently, a noncommunist oath, or other "loyalty" requirements.
That occupational licensing has gone too far, as Professor Gellhorn
asserts, seems apparent. He would have it returned to its primary justification-a prophylactic measure intended to save the public from being
victimized, rather than an economic weapon intended to strengthen the
licensees. Where training and special qualifications are important he would
extend the use of occupational titles for those who meet special occupational
standards without closing the door on all the others; "registered" nurses,
for example. Alternatively, Professor Gellhorn suggests that licenses
issue on application, but be made subject to suspension or revocation for
incompetence or dishonorable conduct relevant to the occupation. The end
product he believes can thus be made licensing for the sake of the public at
large, and not licensing for the sake of the occupations themselves.
Professor Gellhorn's book does not exhaust the potential of its title.
The topics with which he deals are but three of many areas where government has lately become significant, with corresponding reductions in individual freedom. Even together they do not bulk large for the average
American, on whom they rarely impinge directly. That, however, is their
danger. We grow accustomed to un-freedom, and we fail to realize what
we have lost. Professor Gellhorn's thought cannot be repeated too often:
"If we are in fact to survive not merely as a few blobs on a damaged plant but as a society of free men, we must take pains to keep
freedom as well as men alive and vigorous. Today is a perfectly
good day for reminding ourselves that the blessings of liberty have
been hard won in the past and should not be softly lost in the present
through slothfulness, inattention and doubt." (p. 155).
Charles A. Horsky t
t Member, District of Columbia Bar.
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By Piero Calamendrei.

York: New York University Press, 1956.

New

Pp. xiii, 104. $4.50.

In 1952 when this reviewer gave a series of lectures in Spanish on
international law at the Law School of the National University of Mexico,
it so happened that he was preceded and followed, among the foreign
professors invited, by two men who were both great authorities in the field
of legal procedure, both philosophers of law and comparative lawyers, both
practicing lawyers of great reputation: the late Professor Eduardo J.
Couture, eminent Dean of the Law School of the University of Montevideo,
and Professor Piero Calamandrei of the University of Florence. The
latter's lectures, "Processo e Democrazia," are now presented in an excellent English translation by Dr. and Mrs. John Clarke Adams. Fostered
by Professor Bernard Schwartz, who recently edited the work on the "Code
Napoleon and the Common Law World," this book is published in English
under the auspices of the Institute of Comparative Law of New York
University School of Law. Professor Edmond Cahn has written a "Foreword to the American Reader," in which he presents Professor Calamandrei,
a native of Toscana. We are particularly grateful that the author's
"apostrophe to Toscana" is reprinted in the wonderful Italian original,
this beautiful language which has started historically from Firenze---"il
dolce stil fiorentino."
The book is not a treatise on legal procedure, but a series of lectures
in which the author discusses certain connections between the working of
law courts and democracy. The author does so with great scholarly knowledge and practical experience, sometimes with humor full of sympathy wifh
human weaknesses, not unmindful of what Unamuno has called "el sentimiento tr-gico de la vida," and always with deep democratic conviction.
Personal experience under Italian fascism allows him to contrast strongly
the democratic against the totalitarian type of legal process. Taking the
actual Italian law of procedure as a basis, he brings in many other laws
comparatively and often gives an historical look at the development of
certain institutions. He speaks not so much as an expert in procedural law,
as in a philosophical way. That is exactly why these lectures are very
interesting not only to the specialists, but to all jurists.
The first lecture deals with the relation between the law of legal
procedure and the practice of the courts. Not only is the history of the legal
process from the times of the Roman Law in substance the history of the
transformation of judicial practice into the law of legal procedure, but also
today the practice of those who are called upon to put the system into effect
is much more important than the technical perfection of the abstract rules
that regulate it. The democratic element in the law of procedure is the
"rationalization of power"; each decision must be the product of reason,
rather than an arbitrary action. The written law is only a frame. Where
there is a deficiency of civic education and social solidarity, the decay of
democratic institutions is inevitable.
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The next three chapters deal with "the protagonist of the legal drama:
the judge." The second lecture deals with the judge's principal quality:
impartiality, and his duty to give decision on the basis of law. It is characteristic for revolutionary tribunals and also for courts in totalitarian states
that the judge is immersed in politics; more than ever we see today that
"political justice" is no real justice. Hence democracies want to separate
the judge from politics, to separate politics from law. To that end we have
the legislative formulation of law, the concept of the "Rule of Law," and the
separation of powers. For the same reason, doctrine has developed the
theory that a decision is no more than a judicial syllogism, the postulate
of certainty in the law, and the predictability of the decision. The author
naturally shows the untenability of the theory of a judge acting as an
automaton.
The judge is a man and his decision an act of will for which he must
bear the entire responsibility. The necessary pre-condition is the independence of the judge, proclaimed by all democracies. The third lecture
deals with this independence. Independence includes freedom from hierarchic control. It is true, the author states, that the Continental "career
judge" is not subject to any instructions in deciding a single case. But is
he really independent under a parliamentary system in which a Minister
of Justice is responsible before Parliament? He is an official, he is concerned with promotion, he is dependent on his salary. That is why the
author seems to prefer the Anglo-American system of judges. On the other
hand, it may be asked whether a judge is really in this sense independent,
when he is elected. Calamandrei speaks of the "dependence" of the judge
on his future examiners at the time when he is to come up for promotion;
is not the elected judge in a similar position when the time comes for reelection? The author also speaks sympathetically of the "inadequate salary
of a judge that condemns his family to poverty." (p. 37). Here again
much can be learned from the Anglo-American system, which at all times
has not only given to the judge the highest honors and prestige, but also
a relatively high income.
The rationality of the judicial function, characteristic for democracy,
finds expression in the legal prescription of a reasoned opinion. With this
problem the fourth lecture deals. The author recognizes that normally
the judgment is a prius, whereas the reasoned opinion serves to establish
by logic the validity of a decision already reached. He criticizes the fact
that a decision of a bench of judges is reached behind closed doors, whereas
the reasoned opinion appears as unanimous; he, therefore, prefers the
Anglo-American institution of "concurring" and "dissenting opinions," an
institution which has now also been introduced into international courts.
The fifth lecture treats the other two principal actors of the legal
drama, the lawyers who counsel the parties. For the "dialectical aspects
of judicial process" are essential in a democracy. The inquisitorial process,
the present day "totalitarian" processes, where the judge has before him
only unprotected victims, helpless before his arbitrary power and already
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condemned, cannot be called legal processes at all. The "three-dimensional
aspect" is essential; but skeptically the author remarks that progress in
simplification and speeding up of the legal process is made difficult by the
mutual distrust between judges and lawyers. Also from this point of
view the author admires the British system of selecting judges.
The last lecture, finally, deals with respect for the individual in the
judicial process. This respect for the individual is, to a great extent,
achieved as far as civil procedure is concerned. The only exception for the
author lies in the difference between the rich man, who can choose his
lawyer and can choose the best one, and the poor man who, even if counsel
is provided without costs, cannot choose and often "must rely on a thirdrate lawyer quite incapable of coping with the battery of able attorneys
opposing him." (p. 98). But in criminal procedure the author finds the
respect for the individual not yet realized. In the sense of Cesare Beccaria,
he strongly opposes the death penalty; he finds that the "accused is still
an inert object at the mercy of the inquisitor's violence": In criminal procedure, whether he is before the inquisitor who interrogates him, the jailor
who imprisons him, or the executor who takes his life, man is still only
a thing.
Josef L. Kunz t

DELINQUENCY-THE JUVENILE OFFENDER IN AMERICA
TODAY. By Herbert A. Bloch and Frank T. Flynn. New
York: Random House, 1956. Pp. 576. $7.95.
Like a breath of fresh air into a somewhat muddled and muddied subject, loosely categorized as juvenile delinquency, comes a book to gladden
the hearts of not only those who work and study in the field but also those
whose interest is 'of dilettante proportions.
Written by Herbert A. Bloch, professor of sociology at Brooklyn
College, and Frank T. Flynn, professor in the School of Social Service
Administration at the University of Chicago, this effort is far and away
one of the best treatises on a most complicated theme. It approaches the
subject sensibly and realistically and the conclusions it reaches are arrived
at only after logical and careful study and explanation. If the authors
cannot find answers for various aspects of the studies, they frankly admit
it instead of torturously attempting to arrive at surface-like findings. The
book contains desirable information for the "non-professional" reader together with sufficient technical information for the student in the field.
The reviewer was personally deeply interested in this volume because
of his acquaintanceship with one of the authors, Professor Flynn. Professor
Flynn, a short time before his death, consulted with the reviewer while he
was aiding in the survey of the Juvenile Division of the Municipal Court
of Philadelphia.
t Professor of Law, University of Toledo, College of Law.
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The book is divided into four parts:
1. The Meaning and Scope of Delinquency.
2. Pressures Toward Delinquency.
3. Treatment Agencies.
4. Prevention.
The meaning and scope of delinquency is viewed from two aspectsWhat is delinquency and who are our delinquents? The authors explain
that the generic meaning of delinquency or delinquents can vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, from court to court and from community to
community. Thus, they say that each case must reckon with motivation,
environmental opportunity and community attitude, as far as the meaning
of delinquency is concerned, whereas the definition of delinquent must be
gleaned from both a legal and sociological standpoint.
In explaining pressures toward delinquency the authors admit that
the studies to date in this field are not too satisfactory. They feel that we
must in each case search for the elusive causes, take account of the personality and physical constitution of the delinquent, his emotional pressures and the pressures of environment. The authors, in this respect, make
a great point in demonstrating that there is no real definition for the constitutional psychopathic because in all the studies there is a danger that
the conclusion might express the moral views of the diagnostician or, actually, his inability to diagnose.
A wealth of material for governmental agencies and subdivisions is
contained in the section of the book which concerns itself with treatment
agencies. The roles of the police, detention homes, juvenile courts, training
schools, etc., are all analyzed and given a very realistic appraisal. The
authors, further, have set forth an inter-dependent pattern of these facilities
from which much can be learned by those who have in their power the
setting up and augmenting of training facilities.
The final section of the book is devoted to the prevention of juvenile
delinquency and concerns itself mainly with the responsibility of society
in this respect. The authors make a point of saying that here again there
is no panacea available but that each community must gear its prevention
facilities to the problems within the community.
As I have indicated throughout this review, the appeal of this volume
comes about by virtue of its very realistic approach to the entire problem
rather than to a segment thereof. For instance, in the section dealing with
treatment agencies the authors first set forth four preliminary considerations and then proceed to cover the role of the treatment agency as it
exists and as it should be. When they speak of emotional pressures they
speak in the language of the layman rather than that of the professional.
This type of approach occurs throughout the entire book and should be most
gratifying to the reader.
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In conclusion, it is felt by the reviewer that this volume is a definitely
worthwhile addition to the field which concerns itself with the problems of
the young. Although fairly lengthy it must necessarily be so because of the
fact that the subject itself is not one which can be glossed over with a few
cliches and conclusions. As a judge who spends considerable time dealing
with the problems of youth, I can recommend this volume most highly.
Leonard M. Proppert

' Late Judge, Municipal Court of Philadelphia.
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